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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

This

appeal

State of Utah,
is

conferred

provisions

is taken from the Fourth Circuit Court of

Davis County,
upon

the

Layton Department and jurisdiction

the Utah Court of Appeals

pursuant

of Utah Code Section 78-2a-3 (2) (c) which

to

the

states, in

part, as follows:
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(c) appeals from the circuit courts;
This

is

an appeal from a final judgment

Fourth Circuit Court of Davis County,
Defendant/Appellant

was

rendered

5

the

State of Utah in which the

convicted and sentenced

Layton City Code Section 41-6-44.

in

for

violating

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Should all of the evidence obtained by the Layton police

from the Appellant have been suppressed?
2.
that

two
3#

Did

the Court improperly deny the Appellant's

of the jurors be dismissed for
Should

"intoxilyzer"

the

evidence

request

cause?

concerning the

of

the

test have been admitted by the Court at trial

and

subsequently submitted to the jury?

6

results

STATUTES AND RULES FOR REVIEW
*United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment, states:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable casuse, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
*Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14, states:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause supported
by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
*Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 4, states:
The supreme court shall adopt rules of procedure
and evidence to be used in the course of the state and
shall by rule mangae the appellate
process.
The
legislature
may amend the rules of procedure and
evidence adopted by the supore court upon a vote of twothirds
of
all members of both houses
of
the
legislature. . . .
*Utah

Code Section 41-6-44.3,

amended in 1983,

passed into law in

1979

states:

(1) The commissioner of public safety shall establish
standards for the administration and interpretation of
chemical
analysis of a person f s breath
including
standards of training.
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material
to prove that a person was driving or in actual physical
control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or driving with a blood alcohol content statutorily
prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of
acts, conditions or events to prove that the analysis
was made and the instrument used was accurate, according
to standards established in subsection (1) shall be
admissible if:
(a) The judge finds that they were made in the
regular course of the investigation at or about the
time of the act, condition or event; and
(b) The source of information frpm which made and

7

and

the method and the circumstances of their preparation were such as to indicate their trustworthiness.
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established
under subsection (1) and the conditions of subsection
(2) have been met, there is a presumption that the test
results
are
valid
and
further
foundation
for
introduction of the evidence is unnessary.
*Utah Code Section 77-7-15,

passed in 1980,

reads

as

follows:
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place
when he has reasonable suspicion to believe he has
committed or is in the act of committing or
is
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his actions.
*Utah Code Sections 77-35-18(e)(4) & (14), otherwise
as

Rule 18 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,

known

amended

in

1980, read as follows:
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a
particular juror and may be taken on one or more of the
following grounds:
(4) The existence of any social, legal, business,
fiduciary or other relationship between the prospective
juror and any party, witness or person alleged to have
been victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship when viewed objectively , would suggest to
reasonable minds that the prospective juror would be
unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be
free of favoritism.
A prospective juror shall not be
disqualified solely because he is indebted to or employed by the state or a political subdivision thereof
(14) That a state of mind exists on the part of
the juror with reference to the cause, or to either
party, which will prevent him from acting impartially
and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the
party challenging . . . .
Utah Rules of Evidence:
*The

Preliminary

Note

to

the

Utah

Rules

of

Evidence,

paragraph two, reads as follows:
The Committee met . . . and recommended adoption
of the Federal Rules of Evidence by the Supreme Court
pursuant to the general judicial powers contained in the
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 1 to super8

vise inferior courts, and pursuant to the statutory
rulemaking power of the Supreme Court contained in Utah
Code Annotated, Section 78-2-4 (1953). It was the view
of the Committee that, while the legislature may not
enlarge judicial powers beyond those prescribed by the
Constitution of Utah, Robinson v. Durand, 36 Utah 93,
104 Pac. 760, (1908), the power to promulgate rules is
within the general judicial powers conferred by Article
VIII, Section 1.
Any existing statutes inconsistent
with these rules, if and when these ruj.es are adopted by
the Supreme Court, will be impliedly repealed.
*The

Advisory Committee Note to Rule 101 of the Utah

Ru

of Evidence, paragraph three, reads as follows:
The position of the court in State v. Hansen, 588 P.2d
164 (Utah 1978) that statutory provisions of evidence
law inconsistent with the rules will take precedence is
rejected.
*Rule

801 (a)

^ (c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence

read

follows:
(a) Statement.
A "statement" is (1) an oral or
written assertion or (2)nonverbal conduct of a person,
if it is intended by him as an assertion.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted.
*Rule 802 of the Utah Rules of Evidence reads as follows:
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law
by these rules.
*Rule

803 (6)

^ (8) of the Utah Rules of Evidence

or
read

follws:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule,
even though the declarant is available as a witness.
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity.
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any
form, or acts, events conditions, opinions or diagnoses,
made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and
if it was the regular practice of that business activity
to make the memorandum, report, record or date compila9

tion, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or
other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as
used in the paragraph includes business, institution,
association, profession, occupation, and calling of
every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
(8) Public records and reports.
Records, reports
statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public
offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of
the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant
to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a
duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases
matters observed by police officers and other law
enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and
prceedings and against the Government in criminal cases,
factual findings resulting from an investigation made
puruant to authority granted by law, unless the sources
of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
18 Utah Advance Reports 3, (1985)
Pursuant to the provisions of Article VIII, Section 4,
Constitution of Utah, as amended, the Court adopts all
existing statutory rules of procedure and evidence not
inconsistent with or superseded by rules of procedure
and
evidence
heretofore adopted by
this
Court.
Effective as of July 1, 1985.
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STATEMENT OF THE CAS?
This
sentence

matter

is

an appeal from a criminal

conviction

for driving under the influence rendered in the

and

Fourth

Circuit Court, Davis County, Layton Department before a jury.
The material facts of this case show that on August 6,
at the hour of 1:00 a.m.,

the appellant,

Mr.

1986

Bennett, was pro-

ceeding

northbound on Main Street in the City of

County,

State of Utah. (Transcript of Trial, p. 44, lines 6-25).

Upon arriving at 1100 N.
blinker signal,
ting

Main,

Mr.

Layton,

Bennett turned on his

turned into the left turn lane,

foreman.

(Transcript

other

traffic

in

Layton

City

Police

undertook
without

of Trial,

Bennett was the

p.45,

construction

the area excepting Officer Patterson
Department who observed

any

traffic

turned

lines 1-9) There was

that

his proper left hand turn into the
committing

left

and, after sit-

in the left turn lane for approximately 20 seconds,

into a construction site where Mr.

Davis

Mr.

of

of

any

the

Bennett

construction

violations

no

site

nature.

(Transcript of Trial, p. 71, lines 15-17).
There

was nothing of value on the site which could be read-

ily removed (Transcript of Trial,

p. 73, lines 14-18; Transcript

of Suppression Hearing, p. 22, lines 23-25 and p. 23, lines 1-2),
nor

was the site posted with "no trespassing" signs

of Suppression Hearing,

p.

23,

lines 16-18).

(Transcript

The area was not

encircled with a fence (Transcript of Suppression Hearing, p. 21,
lines

4-6) . There

were no reports of burglaries at

(Transcript of Suppression Hearing,
line 1).

11

p.

24,

the

site.

lines 24-25; p. 25,

Officer Patterson did not observe Mr.
criminal

activity,

nor did he suspect Mr-

activity (Transcript of Trial,
of

Bennett undertake any

p.

74,

Bennett of

criminal

lines 6-18).

the utter lack of any reasonable suspicion that

In spite
Mr.

Bennett

was engaged or had been engaged in any criminal activity, Officer
Patterson turned into the construction site,
light, and directed the spotlight at

activated his spot-

Mr. Bennett, (Transcript of

Trial, p. 47, lines 16-19).
In
from

response to the police spotlight,

his

vehicle,

1-19)

Bennett

approached Officer Bennett,

officer the nature of the problem.
lines

Mr.

and

emerged

asked

(Transcript of Trial,

The officer then noted the odor of alcoholic

the

p

48,
bev-

erages on the breath of Mr. Bennett, (Transcript of Trial, p. 49,
lines 1-8) administered a series of field sobriety tests, (Transcript of Trial,
under

p.

50. lines 3-4)

and later placed Mr. Bennett

arrest for "Driving Under the Influence."

(Transcript

of

Trial, p. 58, lines 12-19).
Mr.

Bennett

was subsequently administered an "Intoxilyzer"

test, (Transcript of Trial, p. 86, lines 1-3) and evidence of the
test result was admitted at trial over the objection of

counsel.

The

hearsay.

objections

were

(Transcript of Trial,

based on lack of foundation
p.

91,

and

lines 5-12; p. 92, lines 8-25, p.

93, lines 1-17).
In choosing the jury panel, counsel for Mr. Bennett objected
to

two of the jurors for cause.

The Court denied the

request,

and counsel was forced to use two of his peremptory challenges on
the

two objectionable jurors.

A specific outline of the

inent facts of the jury selection process is provided:
12

pert-

a

*

Mr. Hill: The first juror to whicih Mr. Bennett objected

was a Mr. Hill who is a reserve police officer for Kaysville City
and

is qualified as a Category 2 police officer.

(Transcript of

trial, page 9, lines 1-6). He was familiar with two of the prosecution witnesses who are police officers with Layton City
script of trial,
Hill

page 6, line 25; page 7, lines 1-18).

(Tran-

When Mr.

revealed that he was a part-time police officer,

the Court

inquired further concerning his attitudes, and asked:
THE COURT: Okay.
Would the fact that you
police training give you a problem in being
impartial to both sides here?

had that
fair and

MR. HILL: I don't believe so.
THE COURT: All right, thank you.
Is there any
response? All right, we have none further.
The Court made no further inquiries ihto Mr.
to be impartial.
exercise
Court

to

Hill's ability

Subsequently, before taking the opportunity to

peremptory challenges,
dismiss

other

Mr.

appellant's attorney moved

Hill for cause.

The

dialogue

was

follows:
MR. WANGSGARD: I might preface thi$, it is not my
intention to embarrass anyone or otherwise discredit you
in any form or fashion. I just believe that because of
certain affiliations of certain of the jurors that it
would be difficult to get a fair trial with respect to
any one of these particular jurors.
In particular, Mr.
Hill as a Category 2 police officer. I believe that his
position and the affiliation with a law enforcement
agency would make it difficult an<fl I believe his
responses to your questions has indicated that it would
perhaps be best that he be excused for cause.
THE COURT: All right,
prosecutor]

thank you.

Mr.

Garside.

[The

MR. GARSIDE: Your Honor, I think he has been quite
candid and he says that he knows the officers, he hasn't
worked with any of these officersK
He's not
a
13

the
as

departmental officer and has indicated he is a reserve
officer as opposed to a full-time officer and I think
that he has not shown any indications of prejudice one
way or another.
THE COURT: Thank you.
In light of the statutory
criteria by which we select jurors, in light of Mr.
Hill's answers, the Court denies the challenge for
cause.
Therefore,
regarding

Mr.

the
Hill,

Court

denied

the

challenge

for

cause

and Mr. Bennett was forced to use one of

his peremptory challenges on Mr. Hill (R. p. 35).
b.
to

Mrs. Seamons;

During voir dire, Mrs. Seamons asked how

tell the difference between a little drinking and no drinking

(Transcript of Trial, p. 13, lines 7-9). The Court indicated that
she
of

would have to listen to the evidence and decide
Trial,

p.

13,

lines 10-16) and Mrs.

(Transcript

Seamons responded

as

follows:
MRS. SEAMONS: Okay, that's why I would want to change
the law to there could be no drinking because alcohol
affects every person differently.
THE COURT: All right.
Let me ask you, if you were
chosen as a juror in this case, could you apply the law
as I have given it to you? Would you apply the law as I
have given it to you?
MRS. SEAMONS: I would try to.
(Transcript of Trial, p. 13, lines 17-24)
The

Court

asked a few other questions,

and then asked

if

"anybody in your household, that is a member of MADD, RIDD, PADD,
or any of those organizations similar to that, whose principal or
sole

objective is to remove drinking drivers from

Mrs.

Seamons?

lines

1-3).

(Transcript of Trial,
Mrs.

Seamons

the

highway?

p. 14, lines 24-25; p. 15,

responded that she was a member

MADD, and the Court queried as follows:
14

of

THE COURT: All right. Considering yoqr membership, and
I assume support with time and effort and so forth in
that organization, if you were chosen as a juror, would
you be able to be fair and objective in weighing the
testimony and be indifferent to other considerations,
your general view about drinking and driving, relative
to Mr. Bennett? Could you be fair and objective with
him?
MRS. SEAMONS: I think so.
(Transcript of Trial, p. 15, lines 5-]j3)
The Court inquired no further on the ability of Mrs. Seamons
to

be

inquire

impartial in her judgment of Mr.

Bennett,

and

did

not

any further concerning the extent of her involvement

in

MADD or the strength of her committment to MADD and its principles.
Counsel

for appellant later asked the Court to excuse

Mrs.

Seamons for cause:
MR. WANGSGARD:
Additionally, Your Honor, we would
challenge Mrs. Seamons for cause.
She has indicated
that she doesn't believe that it's correct for anyone to
have anything to drink and drive at all.
She is a
member of MADD. We believe that she should properly be
excused for cause.
THE COURT: All right,
respond, Mr. Garside?

thank you.

Do

you

want

to

MR. GARSIDE: Your honor, in light of that I think that
even though she said that she — that that is her
opinion and that she is affiliated with that association
that indeed she would follow the laws instructed by the
Court and I think thatfs the primary criteria in
consideration here.
THE COURT: Thank you. In light of her responses to the
Court's questions upon explanation of the issues and Mr.
Bennett's position before the Court, the Court denies
that challenge for cause.
(Transcript of Trial, p. 32, lines 7-23)
Again,
dismiss
the

a

juror.

the

Court

motion

to

juror for cause based upon the slight examination

of

Mrs.

denied appellant'^ counsel's

Seamons was later dismissed from the panel by
15

appellant's

counsel

with

one

of

his

remaining

peremptory

challenges (R. p. 35)•
The
choosing

appellant

used

the jury panelf

all of his peremptory

challenges

two of which challenges were

Hill and Mrs. Seamons. (R. p. 35)

16

for

in
Mr.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

A.
Mr.

The

Bennett

enforcement
had

no

trial court below improperly denied the Motion
to

suppress

evidence

gathered

by

the

officers on the grounds that the Layton City

reasonable suspicion of the commission of

acts by Mr. Bennett.
presence

the

of

any

of.
law

police
criminal

Mr. Bennett did not perform any acts in the

the officer which gave grounds for the

officer

to

stop Mr. Bennett and investigate his persoh.
B.

During examination of the jury panel, it was discovered

that two of the jurors should have been dismissed for cause.

The

Court refused to dismiss the jurors for cause,

Mr.

Bennett

to

use

two

suspect

jurors.

thus forcing

of his peremptory challenges

on

the

two

The refusal of the Court to dismiss the jurors

for cause was prejudicial to the interests of Mr. Bennett.
C.
by

Court

hearsay

evidence which did not come within the exceptions to the

hearsay

contained

Procedure.
have
for

over the objections of Mr.

within

Rule

803 of the

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Because the evidence was hearsay evidence and should

been rejected by the Court,
the

Bennett

accepted

was

rule

the

The evidence submitted by the prosecution and

testimony

elicited

with

there was no proper foundation
respect

performance on the blood alcohol level tes^.

17

to

Mr.

Bennett's

ARGUMENT
A.
Incident

Should
to

the

Evidence

Obtained by

the

Layton

the Stop and Subsequent Search and Seizure

Police
of

Mr,

Bennett Have Been Suppressed by the Court Below?
1. RECITATION OF THE APPLICABLE FACTS:
At

the hearing on Mr.

the Court on October 30,
Court

heard

"reasonable

Bennett's Motion to Suppress held by

1986 prior to trial of this matter, the

testimony from the City of

of

the

concerning

the

suspicion" which the police authorities had to stop,

search and seize the appellant,
the hearing,

Layton

Mr. Bennett, in this action.

At

testimony was elicited from Officer David Patterson

Layton Police Department that he was on

patrol

in

the

early morning of August 6, 1986 within the city limits of Layton,
Utah.
Officer

Patterson testified that he observed Mr.

Bennett's

vehicle stopped in the left hand turn lane, with its left blinker
signaling.

(Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Suppress,

p.

8,

lines 12-18)

Although there was no other traffic on the

Mr.

stayed in the left hand turn lane for approximately

Bennett

20 seconds before turning into a construction
of Hearing on Motion to Suppress,
did

not

p.

27,

lines

struction site,

nor did he observe

any

(Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Suppress,

9-12) Upon observing Mr.

construction site,

(Transcript

p. 9, lines 13-15) The Officer

observe any traffic violation,

criminal activity.

site.

street,

Bennett turn

into

the

Officer Patterson turned into the vacant con-

pulled within four car lengths of Mr.

Bennett's

vehicle, and directed his spotlight onto Mr. Bennett. (Transcript
of Hearing on Motion to Suppress,

18

p.

15, lines 2-9). There was

nothing

of

value

on the site which coulcj be

(Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Suppress,

readily

removed

p. 22, lines 8-11,

19-21, 23-25; p. 23, lines 1-2), and there was no gate or fencing
or

posting against trespassing (Transcript of Hearing on

Motion

to Suppress, p. 21, lines 4-6, p. 23, lines 15-21).
Mr.

Bennett then exited his vehicle, approached the officer,

and asked "What is the problem?" (Transcript of Hearing on Motion
to Suppress, p. 16, lines 19-20) at which point Officer Patterson
testifies

that

he noticed the odor of alcfohol on the breath

of

Mr. Bennett. (Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Suppress, p. 18,
lines 11-14).
On

cross-examination,

Officer Patterson testified that

had not observed Mr. Bennett engaged in any criminal activity:
Q: (By Mr. Wangsgard) Had you observed Mr. Bennett
engage in any criminal activity prior to the time you
turned on your spotlight?
A: No.
. . . .

Q: Did you have a reason—okay, you had a hunch, you had
a suspicion something might be afoot.
A: Yes.
Q: But nothing you can really pin it to|?
A: No, just suspicion.
Q:
Okay.
Would it
suspicion as a hunch?

be

fair

to

characterize

that

A: Not a hunch, no.
Q: A gut feeling?
A: A hunch or a gut feeling is more than a suspicion.
Q: Is more than a suspicion?
So it didn't rise to the
level of a hunch in your estimation, or a gut feeling?

19

he

A: Not at that point, it was just a suspicion.
(Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Suppress,

p. 27, lines 9-12,

p. 28, lines 1-14).
Therefore, in summary, Officer Patterson failed to state any
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity on the part
of Mr.

Bennett, and indeed did not have even a "hunch" or a "gut

feeling"

that any criminal activity was being undertaken or

had

been undertaken by Mr. Bennett at the time that Officer Patterson
stopped his patrol car within four car lengths of
vehicle

and

directed

his

spotlight in the

Mr.

Bennett's

direction

of

Mr.

Bennett's vehicle.
2.

ARGUMENT:
a.

Controlling

i.

Terry v. Ohio

Decisions

of

the United

States

Supreme

Court:

As
Justices

392 U.S. 1 (1967).

the parent of numerous interpretive offspring
of

the United States Supreme Court,

by

later

Terry, Id.

stands for the proposition that the rights granted in the

Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, i.e.,
[T]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses,
papers,
and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated
. . . .
Article Four, United States Constitution.
shall not be violated.
The
two
24

facts of Terry concerned a police officer who

men walk past and peer into a store window on
different occasions over a period a few

hours,

with furtive conversations with a third person.

20

observed

approximately
interspersed

Thereafter, with

his suspicion of criminal activity reasonably aroused,

the offi-

cer questioned the individuals, received illogical responses, and
feeling

threatened

covered

concealed

for his safety,

searched the men

weapons on their persons.

and

They were

dissubse-

quently arrested and convicted of possessing concealed weapons.
Before
discussed
stressed

discussing the particulars of the

case,

the

Court

the need for enforcement of the Fourth Amendment,
that

the

Fourth Amendment is

the

private

protection from "lawless police conduct" T^rry,

and

citizen's

supra at 12

and

that of the Fourth Amendment,
[E]xperience has taught that it [The F|ourth Amendment]
is the only effective deterrent to police misconduct in
the criminal context, and that without it the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and
seizures would be a mere form of words.
.

*

.

c

A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial,
recognize, has the necessary effect of legitimizing
conduct
which
produced the
evidence,
while
application of the exclusionary rule withholds
constitutional imprimatur. I_d. at 12, 13.
The

Court

recognized that a police officer,

we
the
an
the

on the

beat,

does not necessarily have the time or the prediliction to analyze
whether he is affecting the constitutional imprimatur,
the

but

police officer must be aware that whenever a police

that

officer

accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to move away,

he

has "seized" that person and that such seizure may be a violation
of the individual's rights under the Fourth Amendment.
Answering a query regarding the limitations of an officer in
accosting an individual, the Court established a standard against
which the

police officer must measure his activities:

[B]alancing

the

need to search [or
21

seize]

against

the

invasion which the search [or seizure] entails," [citing
Camara v. Municipal Court 387 U.S. 523, 534-535, 536537, (1967)] And in justifying the particular intrusion
the police officer must be able to point to specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant
that intrusion, (emphasis added).

This demand for specificity in the information upon
which
police action is predicated is the central
teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Terry, supra at 21.
Stated

in

a different fashion,

the Court reiterated the

above

declaration and stated:
[I]n making that assessment [the reasonableness of the
search or seizure] it is imperative that the facts be
judged against an objective standard: would the facts
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or
the search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief" that the action taken was appropriate? . . . .
Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed # rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court
has consistently refused to sanction. Id at 22.
In spite of the ruling by the Supreme Court in Terry that
search

or

seizure must be more than inarticulate

hunches,

Court below ignored the Terry standard and allowed the
of

evidence

even

a

the

admission

gathered by an officer who admittedly did not

have

a "hunch" or a "gut feeling" of criminal activity prior

to

the seizure of Mr. Bennett. By his own admission, the officer did
not

observe

certainly
culable

Mr.

Bennett engaged in any criminal

could not and did not recite any "specific
facts"

stated with "specificity" which

officer's intrusion upon Mr.
fact,

activity

stated

Bennett's person.

his reason for stopping Mr.

arti-

warranted

the

The officer,

in

Bennett did not

rise to the level of an "inarticulate hunch."
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The flaw in the State's case i s that none cf the
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preceding the o f f i c e r s 1 detention of the
•appell ant justified a reasonable suspi cion that
no was
i nvolved in criminal conduct.
, . . The fact t^a 1 the
appellant
. was in a neighborhood frequented by
drug,
users,. standing alone, is not a basis for
concluding
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conduct. B r o w n , supra a t 5 i «
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-.z&r.n&i - • n

-

.-

'rjv^

any

01 had engaged

in

criminal activity,

and certainly had observed no

supporting

facts.

The

unavoidable conclusion is that the stop seizure

by

Officer

Patterson was impermissible and any evidence garnered as

a result of that stop must be suppressed.
b.
The

Controlling Decisions of the Utah Supreme Court:

Utah

situations

of

Amend-

Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 14 rights and

Code Section 77-7-15.

Court

number

involving United States Constitutional Fourth

ment rights,
Utah

Supreme Court has recently reviewed a

In each instance,

the Utah

Supreme

has closely followed the guidelines set out by the

United

States Supreme Court in the decisions above.
i.
Two
While

State v. Swanigan 699 P.2d 718 (1985).

police

enroute

officers investigated a report of
to investigate,

they noticed the

a

burglary.

appellant

and

another person walking along the road approximately a block
the

buglarized residence.

"attempt
third

from

The officers reported to dispatch an

to locate" the two individuals.

Two

hours

later, a

officer located the two persons approximately three blocks

from the buglarized residence,
asked

for identification.

rants,

the

police

stopped the two individuals,

After checking for outstanding

officer discovered there was an

and
war-

outstanding

traffic warrant on the appellant, and arrested the appellant.
searching

the appellant after the arrest,

certain

items

In

taken

from the buglarized home were found.
The
being

appellant

gathered

filed a motion to suppress the

evidence

in violation of his Fourth amendment rights

the trial court denied the motion.

24

as
and

T1 i e I11: a il: I S i i p r e in e C o i i :i : t: r e l:r e r s e d 11 i e

- . • • v: <=• - *- ' • -: * * ; c u o n u

a p p e 11 a n t, s t a t i n g:
i , brief investigatory stop of an i ndividual by police
officers is permissible when the officers "have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective f a c t s , that the
individual is involved in criminal activity."
[T]he officer w h o stopped defendant and his companion
lacked a reasonable suspicion to believe they had e n gaged in criminal c o n d u c t . T h e stop w a s based solely on
a description by a fellow officer w h o had observed the
I :wo w a l k i n g along the street at a late hour in an area
where recent burglaries had been reported.
Neither
officer had any knowledge that defendant and h i s companion had been at the scene of the c r i m e . T h e officers
had n o t observed the m e n engaged in any unlawful or
suspicious activity. O n the facts presented, the stop
was based o n a mere hunch rather that the c o n s t i t u t i o n ally mandated "reasonable s u s p i c i o n " ; c o n s e q u e n t l y , the
confiscated evidence w a s erroneously admitted a t t r i a l .
Supra.
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'ne litan S u p r e m e Court-

stated:
The stop w a s based merely on the fact that a c a r with
out-of-state 1icense plates w a s mo\ i ng slowly through a
25

neighborhood late at night.
The officer had no objective facts on which to base a reasonable suspicion that
the men were involved in criminal activity.
The ruling
of the district court is affirmed.
Carpena, supra at
675.
Again,

the Utah Supreme Court affirmed that before an offi-

cer is allowed to stop any person,
sonable suspicion,

the officer must have a

based on objective facts,

rea-

that the person is

involved in criminal activity.
iii. State v. Constantino 732 P.2d 125 (1987).
In

this recent Utah case,

police
had

the appellant was observed by

officer driving a car on the public roads.

The

a

officer

personal knowledge that appellant's drivers license was sus-

pended

and also recognized the passenger from an arrest

of which the officer had personal knowledge.
into consideration,

warrant

Taking these facts

the officer stopped the automobile, arrested

appellant,

and

impounded the automobile.

During an

search

of

the

automobile the officer found

trunk,

and

inventory

marijuana

in

the appellant was charged with possession of a

the
con-

trolled substance.
The
court

appellant moved to suppress the evidence.

denied

the motion.

On appeal,

the Utah

stated that the police officer did have an
able

suspicion

officer

was

of criminal activity,

appropriate

due to his

The district

Supreme

articulable,

Court

reason-

and that the stop by
knowledge

of

the

appellant's

suspended driver's license and the outstanding warrant.
In

the

matter at bar,

Officer Patterson claimed

no

such

individuals

from

knowledge at.the time of the seizure of Mr. Bennett.
c.
The

Statutory Provisions of the Utah Code:

constitutional

protections afforded
26
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follows:
2 peace officer may stop any person in a pu.blic place
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name, address and an explanation of his actions.
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offense.
r^co^~

rela-

B.

Did the Court Improperly Deny Mr.

Bennett's Request to

Dismiss Two of the Jurors for Cause?
1.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND:

During voir dire of the jury panel,

Mr.

the Court to dismiss two jurors for cause.

Bennett

requested

The Court refused to

dismiss either of the two persons, and Mr. Bennett therefore used
two

of his peremptory challenges to exclude the two persons from

the jury.
As

is

adequate

more

proof

present.
Mr.

fully set out in the Statement
of

the

potential bias of the

of
two

Hill

was

of

the

and, by judicial decree, is presumed to impli-

a member of MADD,

consume

jurors

is a category two police officer who knew two

citly trust the statements of other peace officers.

stated

Case,

The two jurors should have been dismissed for cause.

City!s witnesses,

is

the

or,

Mrs. Seamons

Mothers Against Drunken Driving,

who

that she did not believe any person should be allowed
alcoholic

beverages,

and did not further

qualify

to
her

blanket statement against the use of alcoholic beverages.
2. ARGUMENT:
In

the Utah case of State v.

(1980) , the
criminal
in

Utah

605

P.2d

Supreme Court was faced with an appeal

765,
of

a

matter where two jurors were not dismissed for cause as

the instant matter,

peremptory

Bailey,

challenges.

forcing the appellant to use two of
In

discussing

the

matter,

his

the

Utah

Supreme Court quotes favorably from the case of Reynolds v.

U.S.

98 U.S. 145 (1978) as follows:
The United States Supreme Court, considering
subject in Reynolds v. U.S. . . . stated that
28

this
"The

t h e o r y o £ t h e 1 a w I s 1I i a t a j u r o i: w 1: 1 o h a s f o r m e d a. n
opinion cannot be impartial..11 Id. a t: 1 5 5 . Chief Justice
M a r s h a 1 1 , presiding over
the tria1 of Aaron Burr I n
1807,
defined an impartial jury as one composed of
persons w h o "will fairly hear the testimony which may be
offered to them, and bring in their v e r d i c t , according
to that testimony, and according to the law arising on
it."
Burr f s Trial p.
415.
Marshall's test for
impartiality, quoted with approval j n Reynolds, is:
[ L ] i g 1 I t i rn p r e s s i o n s w h i c t i in a y f a I r 1 y b e s u p p o s e d t • :::
yield
to the testimony that may be offered; which may
leave the mi nd open to a fair consideration of that
testimony, constitute no sufficient objection to a
juror; but that those strong and deep impressions whi ch
will close the mind against the testimony that may b e
offered
in opposition to them; which will combat
that
testimony and resist its f o r c e , do constitute a s u f f i cient objection t o h i m . Id at 4] 6.
State v. BajJ^ey, supra at 76 7.
rt
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an

impartial iur^

wre r

determine

aiiu d^or enough
be

States Supreme
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mat 4 -r where
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i i.ror ^
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.„.,i* recoqr^;.:-- <

Chea1y,

-*!'/•
• r td' S- preme r'ourj addr^ss^d

>- )

c

'

.-4*

^ejudi ce against- a man making

Wher

askca

« iix^,

-, . answered i

I would if an automobile accident w a s involved, that w a s
relating in any way to an automobile accident, I would
be very strong against i t , not on religious g r o u n d s ,
Id. at 3 78.
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the

Further
that

questioning by the Court elicited a reply from the juror

the

juror would not be prejudiced

notwithstanding

his

previous reply.

against

the

Defendant

The trial Court

did

not

Supreme Court agreed with the appellant that

the

allow a challenge for cause, and the Defendant appealed.
The

Utah

challenge

for cause should have been granted,

stating that

the

juror's state of mind indicated that the juror could not act with
entire impartiality in the matter.
the

However, the Court ruled that

error in refusing to sustain the challenge for cause was not

prejudicial because there was no evidence in the record that

the

appellant used all of his peremptory challenges.
In 1977,

the Court again addressed the issue of a challenge

to a juror for cause in the matter of State v. Moore 562 P.2d 629
(1977) where a member of the panel repeatedly stated that he
not
of

did

know if could honestly be fair in a case involving the
narcotics.

sale

The appellantfs attorney then asked the Court

to

dismiss the juror for cause.
In
court

spite of the obvious prejudice of the juror,

did

exercised

not excuse the juror for cause.
a peremptory challenge on the

the

trial

The appellant

juror.

The

appellant

subsequently used all of his peremptory challenges.
On appeal, the Court stated:
The defendant was required to exercise one of his
peremptory challenges to challenge a juror who clearly
stated he was not sure he could be impartial and
unbiased in deciding the case. The failure of the trial
court to excuse the juror Rock for actual bias as that
term is defined in [the predecessor statute to 77-35-18]
was prejudicial and in effect it deprived defendant of
one of his statutory peremptory challenges in that he
was
required to exercise one of
the
peremptory
challenges to have Rock excused from serving on the
30

then

jury.

The trial court erred in refusing to excuse 1 Ir
Rock
upon challenge being made by defendant's attorney i n
accordance with statute and it appeari ng clearly that
Mr. Rock w a s actually biased, as that term is defined in
our statute.
Supra. at 8 31
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....
tha*

: „nd, but
r.e

.* i u l d

not

favor the police over the defendant.

Therefore,

the Court found

that the second juror had such
[S]trong and deep impressions with regard to the veracity of police officer's testimony [that he] would
credit a police officer's testimony to an undue extent.
He should have been dismissed for cause. Therefore,
forcing defendants to use one of their peremptory challenges to remove [the juror] resulted in prejudicial
error. Supra, at 27.
Just
Hewitt

as

the second juror was dismissed for

cause

in

case because he was of the temperment to give the

officer's

testimony undue weight,

dismissed

from the jury panel for cause because of

inclination
weight.

to

so should Mr.

give a fellow police officer's

police

Hill have been
his

natural

testimony

undue

The Utah case of State v. Nielson, 727 P.2d 188, (1986)

concerned

the

validity of a search warrant based on

the

information provided by a police officer to the magistrate.
State,

arguing

"warrants
police

the

in support of the search warrant,

may be issued upon even the 'double

officers

under

the general rule

that

false
The

reasoned that

hearsay1
law

between

enforcement

officers are presumed to tell each other the truth. . . . " 1A. at
191.

The

Court agreed with the State's reasoning,

and stated:

"there is a presumption that law enforcement officers will convey
information to each other truthfully." j[_d. at 192.
If law enforcement officers are presumed to tell each
the truth, then Mr. Hill certainly could not
evaluation

be objective in his

of the testimony of Officer Patterson,

sumption by Mr.

other

for the

pre-

Hill, a law enforcement officer, is that Officer

Patterson tells the truth.
Applying the above cases to the instant matter, it is clear

32
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which w:.. orevent
without nre;udi ce to

of mind exists on the part of the
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him from acting impartially and
the substantial rights of - he party
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challenging

....

Without question,
cause,

both Mr.

Mr.

Bennett was entitled to exclude, for

Hill and Mrs. Seamons on the basis of the above

statute and the heavy weight of authority supporting this point.
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September 1, 1983.
indicate
rules,
will

that

The Preliminary Note to the Rules of Evidence

"any existing statutes

inconsistent

with

these

if and when these rules are adopted by the Supreme Court,
be impliedly repealed." (Preliminary Note to Utah Rules

of

Evidence).
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 101,
state

entitled

"Scope"

in the last paragraph that "[t]he position of the court in

State v. Hansen, 588 P.2d 164 (1978) that statutory provisions of
evidence law inconsistent with the rules will take precedence
rejected." (Advisory Notes to Rule 101,

Utah Rules of Evidence).

In addition, 18 Utah Advance Reports 3 states:
Pursuant to the provisions of Article VIII, Section 4,
Constitution of Utah, as amended, the Court adopts all
existing statutory rules of procedure and evidence not
inconsistent with or superseded by rules of procedure
and
evidence
heretofore adopted by
this
Court.
Effective as of July 1, 1985.
Contrary

to the Utah Rules of

Evidence,

Utah

Code

Section 41-6-44.3 states:
(1) The commissioner of public safety shall establish
standards for the administration and interpretation of
chemical
analysis of a person's breath
including
standards of training.
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material
to prove that a person was driving or in actual physical
control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or driving with a blood alcohol content statutorily
prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of
acts, conditions or events to prove that the analysis
was made and the instrument used was accurate, according
to standards established in subsection (1) shall be
admissible if:
(a) The judge finds that they were made in the
regular course of the investigation at or about the
time of the act, condition or event; and
(b) The source of information from which made and
the method and the circumstances of their preparation were such as to indicate their trustworthiness.
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established
under subsection
(1) and the conditions of subsection
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is

(2) have been m e t , there is a presumption that the :- :..t
results
are
valid
and
further
foundati on
r
introduction of the evidence is unnessary

Pule 8C! / c > :-f 4 b- V1 ^\

F";1es of Evidence states:

(c) Hearsay
"Hearsay" is a statement, c tvt- \ *)•-::- one
made by the declarant whi le testifying at the Z L \ 3 \ or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.
t
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operation

and

calibration of the device was

not

present,

but

instead an affidavit under Utah Code 41-6-44.3(b) was admitted to
show that the device was accurate.
The fallacy with the use of an affidavit under Section 41-644.3(b)

is that such section authorizes the use of hearsay

evi-

dence, i.e., documents offered as memoranda or records of acts to
prove the analysis was made and the instrument was accurate.

The

Utah Rules of Evidence do not contain any such exception for

the

use

of

any such document or affidavit to overcome

the

hearsay

rule.
The
instant
record

two

possible

exceptions to the

matter listed under Rule 803 are:

hearsay rule

in

the

subsection 6-allows a

of a regularly conducted activity to be admitted

if

the

custodian of the records testifies of the record's accuracy; and,
subsection
public

8-allows a public record to be admitted only

record

if

the

does not involve a criminal case where there

has

been an observation by a law enforcement officer.
In this matter,
for

there was no custodian to lay a

the admissibility of the questioned exhibits,

ating

the possibility of admission under 803(6).

enforcement

to

the device,

thus

elimin-

And since law

officers witnessed the calibration and operation

the device in question,
present

foundation

of

it was necessary for the officers to

be

testify concerning the calibration and operation

of

but no such officers were present,

eliminating

the

exception provided by 803 (8).
Absolutely
the

proposed

either

no exception to the hearsay rule exists allowing
affidavits to be admitted

into

evidence

without

the custodian of the records or the actual officer admin38

istering

the calibration of the machine to

testify.

However,

the court below disregarded the Utah Rules of Evidence, and chose
to admit the questioned exhibits into evidence under the aegis of
a

statute (Utah Code 41-6-44.3) , which Statute should

considered
dence,

in

light of the advisory notes to the Rules of

supra

18

UAR

3.

be

Evi-

given the fact that the statute has been impliedly

repealed by Article VIII,
interpreted

not

Section 4 of the Utah Constitution

as

by the advisory notes and the per curium opinion

of

The

statute is patently contrary to the

Rules

of

Evidence as adopted by the Utah Supreme Court.
Such
clearly

improper

admission of the

prejudicial

questioned

to the interests of

Mr.

exhibits

Bennett.

was

If

the

exhibits had not been introduced into evidence, no evidence would
have

been

presented

regarding the results of

the

intoxilyzer

device.
The

introduction

prejudicial,

of

the questioned evidence

was

clearly

and the matter should be dismissed, or remanded for

a new trial on such basis.
b.

If

the Court Finds Some Exception to the Hearsay

Rule

Applicable to the Questioned Exhibits, the Exhibits Must Nonetheless

Conform to the Requirements of Utah Code Section

41-6-44.3

as Interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court in Murray v. Hall
In April of 1983, (prior to the adoption by the Utah Supreme
Court
handed
holds

of

the

Utah Rules of Evidence) the

down the case of Murray v.
that

Hall,

Utah
663 P.2d

Supreme

1314, which

in order to admit the affidavit referred to in

Code 41-6-44.3,

Court

Utah

the affidavit had to reflect certain statements,
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including an affirmative showing that the calibration and testing
for
an

accuracy of the device for measuring the alcohol content
individual

established

was performed in accordance

with

the

of

standards

by the Commissioner of Public Safety of the State of

Utah.
The

law enforcement officers used affidavits which

do

not

fully reflect strict compliance with the standards established by
the

Commissioner

followed

in

of

the

Public Safety of the State

calibrating and testing for

of

Utah

accuracy

of

were
the

Intoxilyzer used on Mr. Bennett.
For

the convenience of the Court,

regulations

a copy of the applicable

from the Commissioner of Public Safety

for

comparison

law

enforcement officer conducting the testing of

is

attached

with the actual affidavit which was used by
the

the

machine.

(See, Trial Exhibit C and appendix).
The

affidavit

Intoxilyzer

was

used

by

Layton City to

properly

tested

before

administration of the breath test to Mr.
with

the

Breath

Testing

Safety.

and

that
after

the
the

Bennett does not comply
established

by

the

Commissioner

of

Specifically,

the

following

deficiencies

are clearly apparent on the face of

the

affidavit

when

Public

Regulations

certify

compared with the regulations of the Commissioner of Public

Safety:
1.
regulations)

The

temperature

check.

(Paragraph

3

The affidavit does not specify whether the

of

the

machine

was warmed.
2.
regulations)

Internal

Purge

Check.

(paragraph

The affidavit does not indicate the mode
40

4

of

the

selector

is on the air blank mode.
3.
the

Fixed Absorbtion Calibrator Check.

regulations)

minus

.01%

The

(paragraph 5 of

affidavit allows a variance of

in the calibration setting,

while

the

plus

or

regulations

allow no such variation.
4.
The

Simulator Check.

(paragraph 6 of the regulations)

affidavit does not indicate that an air blank is run on

machine

between

each of the three tests ^s is required

the

by

the

(paragraph 7 of

the

regulations.
5.
regulations)
printer

Printer
The

deactivator

Deactivator Check.

affidavit has no detailed checklist
check as is set out in paragraph 3

for

the

of

the

regulations.
Although the affidavit,
performed
states
must

be

paragraph 2, states the testing was

according to standards,

Murray v.

Hall

that such an assertion is not sufficient,

footnote
and a

showing

made that each and every step required in checking

calibrating the instrument was observed.
face clearly fail in that regard.

41

5,

and

The affidavits on their

CONCLUSION
In conclusion,

Mr. Bennett argues first, the evidence sub-

mitted by Layton City should have been suppressed at the trial as
being the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure.

Second, two

jurors should have been excluded by the court for cause, were not
excluded for cause,
his

peremptory
Finally,

functioning
level

challenges on the
evidence

submitted

two

not
The

Bennett to use two of

persons.

on the issue

of the Intoxilyzer and Mr.

should

foundation.

therefore forcing Mr.

of

the

Bennettfs blood

have been admitted by the Court for

proper
alcohol
lack

documentary evidence offered to establish

of
the

requisite foundational basis for admission of the test results is
clearly

hearsay

evidence which does not fit within any

of

the

exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Mr. Bennett prays that judgment of the lower court be reversed

with

direction to the lower court to enter a

dismissal

of

the case.
Dated this

day of April, 1987.
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BREATH TESTIWG REGULATIONS

PEPARTMEWT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

Revised: November 4,,1983"
Archives file# 6734

I . TECHNIQUES OR METHODS
A.

Tests to determine the concentration of alcohol in a persons blood,
may be applied to blood, breath or other bodily substances.

Results

shall be expressed as equivalent to grams of alcohol per one hundred
(100) cubic centimeters of blood.

The results of such tests shall be

entered in a permanent record book.
B.

Written check lists, outlining the method of properly performing
the tests in use under division A

of this regulation, shall be

available at each location where tests are given.

The check list and

the test record shall be retained by the operator administering the
test or the arresting officer.

Definition:
A check list sets forth the steps, in sequence, that a breath
test operator must follow.

A square is provided by each of the

steps for the operator to check each one as it is performed to
insure proper operation of the test instrument.

II.

BREATH TESTS
A.

Breath samples of alveolar air shall be analyzed with instruments
specifically designed for the analysis of breath.

The calculation

of the blood alcohol concentration shall be on the basis of aveolar
air to blood ratio of 2100:1.

Breath samples shall be analyzed

according to the methods described by the manufacturer of the
instrument or instructions issued by the office of the Commissioner
of Public Safety*

TESTS FOR CHECKING CALIBRATION
A.

Breath testing instruments must be certified oh a routine basis
not to exceed forty (40) days.

B.

Calibration tests must be performed by a technician using appropriate solutions of ethyl alcohol, and using methods and techniques for
checking calibration recommended by the manufacturer of the
instrument or the office of the Commissioner of Public Safety.

C.

Results of test for calibration shall be kept in a permanent record
book.

A report of each calibration test shall be recorded on the

appropriate form and sent to the supervisor of the Breath Testing
Program.

The supervisor of the Breath Testing Program is hereby

designated as the official keeper of said records.
PROCEDURE FOR CERTIFICATION OF INSTRUMENTS

A.

Breathalyzer
1.

Instrument heating properly:
a.

2.

3.

between 47 and 53 degrees centigrade

Collection chamber output:
a.

COLD between 55 and 58 cc's

b.

WARM between 50 and 54 cc"s

NULL meter functioning properly:
a*

Must be able to achieve a balance and swing freely in both
directions.

4.

Read light in mechanical center:
Place two ampoules of the same control number in the holders,
turn on the read light, balance galvanometer and check for
mechanical center.
light.

Switch the ampoules, turn on the read

The null meter should not swing more than I inch in

either direction.

5.

Blood alcohol pointer slippage check:
Balance the instrument with ampoules in the holders.

Set

the blood alcohol pointer on .20%, or center of the Blood
Alcohol scale.

Using the light carriage adjustment, and with

the read light on, run the B. A . needle to .00% and back to
.20%, observing to see that the null meter balances at the
same time the B. A . needle reaches .20%. Then run the B.A.
needle to .40% and back to .20% observing to see that the null
meter balances at the .20% line on the blood alcohol scale.

6.

Simulator Check:
At least three (3) simulator checks of a known value shall be
run on the instrument.

The results must be within .01% plus

or minus of the actual value of the known solution.
7.

Ampoule Check:
A series of simulator tests with the accumulated total of .60%
shall be run on an ampoule from each control number on hand
with the instrument.

The results of each simulator test must

be within .01% plus or minus of the actual value.

The ampoule

should then be observed to see if there is a slight yellow color,
indicating the presence of potasium dichromate.

If it meets the

above standards, the chemicals are correct or within allowed
tolerances.

B.

Intoxilyzer
1.

Place the mode selector switch in the zero set mode.

2.

ELECTRICAL POWER CHECK:

With the power switch on,

observe to see that the power indicator light comes on,
indicating there Is electrical power to the instrument.
3.

TEMPERATURE CHECK:

If the instrument is already

warmed up, check to see that the ready light is on.
If it is not warmed up, wait approximately 10 minutes
to see that the ready light comes on.

(This light

indicates that the sample chamber is heated to the
proper temperature).
4.

INTERNAL PURGE CHECK:
the air blank mode.

Put the mode selector in

Place thumb on the end of the pump

tube to see that it is pumping air.

Time the pumping

sequence to see that it pumps for approximately 35
seconds.
5.

ZERO SET AND ERROR INDICATOR CHECK:
Set the mode selector in the zero set mode.

(AS Model)
Depress the

zero adjust knob and adjust the digital display to a plus
• 000, . 0 0 1 , .002 or .003 to see that you can achieve a proper
zero set.

Re-set the digital display above the acceptable plus

.000 to .003.

Place the mode selector to the test mode and

observe to see that the error light comes on.

Repeat, placing

the digital display at minus .000 and observe to see that the
error light comes on when the mode selector is placed in the
test mode.

(ASA Model)
Advance the test cycle to the zero set mode and see that
the unit registers a reading of plus .000, . 0 0 1 , .002, or
.003.

If this reading is not observed, advance to the next

cycle and see that the error light comes on.
FIXED ABSORBTION CALIBRATOR CHECK: With the test
card in the p r i n t e r , run a test on the fixed absorbtion
calibrator to see that the instrument gives the correct
reading on the digital display and the printed test card.
T H I S CHECK NOT REQUIRED ON INSTRUMENTS NOT
EQUIPPED WITH THE FIXED ABSORBTION CALIBRATOR.
SIMULATOR CHECK : Run three tests on a simulator
solution of a known value and an air blank before each
one.

Observe to see that the correct readings, within

plus or minus .01% of the actual value is indicated on the
digital display and printed on the test card for each simulator test and a .00% reading for each air blank.
PRINTER DEACTIVATOR CHECK:

(AS Model)

Run a

simulator test with the zero set NOT in the proper zero
set range, to see that the printer is deactivated and will
not p r i n t .
(ASA Model)
This check must be performed before the unit is up to
operating temperature . (before the ready lamp is on)
Advance the unit to the first purge cycle (air b l a n k ) .
Observe the error light to see that it is lit.

At the end

of the test cycle (approximately 35 seconds), see that the
pump stops and that the printer is deactivated and will
not p r i n t .

QUALIFICATIONS OF PERSONNEL
A.

Breath test shall be performed by a qualified operator who shall
have completed the operators course prescribed by the Commissioner
of Public Safety.

Operators shall use only those instruments

which they are certified to operate.
B.

Breath test operator certification requirements:
1.

Must have successfully completed training for each type of
instrument and pass the required test, as approved by the
Commissioner of Public Safety.

2.

Operators must complete an approved recertification training
course and pass a test every two (2) years to maintain their
certification.

C.

Breath test technician requirements:
1.

Must comply with one of the following:
a.

Must successfully complete the Breath Testing Supervisors
course offered by Indiana State University.

b.

A manufacturers repair technician course for the breath
testing instruments in use in the State of Utah.

c.

Be qualified by the nature of his employment or training
to maintain and repair the breath testing instrument in
question and to instruct in the proper operation of the
instrument.

REVOCATION OF CERTIFICATION

A.

The Commissioner of Public Safety may on the recommendation of
a technician, revoke the certification of any operator:

1.

Who obtains a certification card falsely or deceitfully.

2.

Who fails to comply with the foregoing provisions governing
the operation of breath test instruments.

3.

Who fails to demonstrate satisfactory performance in
operating breath testing instruments.

VII.

PREVIOUSLY QUALIFIED PERSONNEL
The foregoing regulations shall not be construed as invalidating the
qualification of personnel previously qualified as either breath test
operators or breath test technicians under programs existing prior
to the promulgation of these regulations.

Such personnel shall be

deemed certified until such time as retraining would have been required were these regulations not in effect.
This provision shall take effect as if enacted contemporaneously with
the other Breath Testing Regulations of the Department of Public
Safety on June 11, 1979.
In the opinion of the Department of Public Safety, it is necessary to
the peace, health and welfare of the inhabitants of the State of Utah
that this regulation become effective immediately.

Training for original certification is to be conducted by a Breath
Test Technician and should include the following:
1 hour.. .Welcome, registration, preview of Alcohol and Traffic Safety.
3 hours. .Effects of Alcohol in the Human Body.
3 hours. .Operational Principles of Breath Testing.
2 hours. .Alcoholic Influence Report Form.
2 hours. .Testimony of the Arresting Officer.
3 hours. .Legal Aspects of Chemical Testing.
1 hour...Detecting the Drinking Driver.
8 hours. .Laboratory Participation.

(Running Simulator tests on the

instruments and tests on actual drinking subjects).
1 hour*. .Examination and Critiques of Course.
Training for recertification is to be conducted by a Breath Testing
Technician and should include the following:
2 hours. .Effects of alcohol in the Human Body.
2 hours. .Operational principles of Breath Testing.
1 hour.. .Alcohol Influence Report Form and Testimony of arresting officer.
2 hours..Legal Aspects of Chemical Testing and Detecting and the
Drinking D r i v e r .
1 hour. . . E x a m .
Anyone having previously successfully completed a twenty-four (24)
hour operators school, may be recertified at anytime by successfully
completing an eight (8) hour recertification course, and also may be
certified to operate another type of breath testing instrument after
eight (8) hours instruction pertaining to the instrument in question.

